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In this paper we present a partial equilibrium model of tax evasion in which evasion is modeled 
as a discrete variable, i.e. whether to join the underground economy or noto Several equilibrium 
concepts are used to analyze the game of the government against a single taxpayer. 
1. Introduction 
The problem of tax evasion arises in an economy in which every taxpayer 
regards the output of the public sector as independent of her actions and the 
taxpayer can be audited by the public authority and fined, if found guilty. 
Earlier contributions to the study of tax evasion in a game-theoretical 
framework include Sandmo (1981), Reinganum and Wilde (1985, 1986), 
Graetz et al. (1986), Greenberg (1985), Benjamini and Maital (1985), Schlicht 
(1985), Mookherjee and P'ng (1986), Scotchmer (1987), Border and Sobel 
(1987), and Ortuño-Ortín (1991). Each of these papers focuses on the 
problem from a different angle, and obtains sorne conclusions on the welfare 
effects of tax evasion [a review of this literature can be found in Cowell 
(1985, 1990) and Mookherjee (1989)]. In all these papers, evasion is modeled 
as a continuous variable, i.e. the range of evasion goes from zero to the value 
of due taxes. A prominent example of this kind of situation is income tax 
evasion. 
No matter how important these situations are, there are examples in which 
it is more natural to model evasion as a discrete choice model, reflecting an 
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indivisibility in the choice of the potential tax-payers [see Cowell (1985, p. 
174 footnote)]. Thus, for a given activity, the choice is either to be on the 
legal side, or to become a member of the underground economy. Examples 
of latter inelude barter transactions, black markets, illegal gambling and 
prostitution, secret workshops (shoes, garments, leather, furniture), street 
vendors, 'gypsy' cabs, rental of spare rooms, secret accounts in foreign 
countries, elandestine building, etc. In all these situations the parties con-
cerned have no incentive to provide information (this lack of incentive is 
particularly acute if the workers involved are receiving unemployment 
benefits). Moreover, even in the income tax case, if someone decides to fill in 
a tax form underestimating his income, additional information is also 
transmitted: profession, address, etc. In sorne cases these signals may be so 
elear that it would be preferable not to fill this form in at all. This situation 
is particularly relevant in countries in which the fight against tax evasion is 
new and the public sector is relatively unorganized. For instance during the 
period 1983-1989 two million new taxpayers were discovered in Spain. 
This paper presents a static par ti al equilibrium model of tax evasion in 
which there are two pure strategies for each player: for the taxpayer to evade 
or to pay due taxes (i.e. to be inside or outside the black economy) and for 
the government to monitor or not to monitor. 1 Thus our model - which is 
akin to those of externality causing behavior [see Becker (1968) and 
Mookherjee (1989)] or Inspector vs. Evader games [see Rapoport (1966)] -
differs from previous work in the dichotomous choice of taxpayers and in 
that strategies for the government are interpreted as monitoring rather than 
auditing. 
The rest of the paper goes as follows. In section 2 we analyze the game of 
the government against a single taxpayer, assuming that the government 
attempts to maximize net revenue [this assumption is also made by Graetz et 
al. (1986) and Border and Sobel (1987)]. It is shown that: 
a. There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, but there is in mixed 
ones. This implies that the existing uncertainty is endogenous, caused by 
the randomized choices of the players. 
b. In expected terms the taxpayer pays the entire tax. 
c. An increase in the penalty for evasion increases the government's payoff 
but lea ves untouched the taxpayer's expected utility. 
d. The government cannot expect any gain by announcing (and being 
committed to) its true policy (i.e. being a Stackelberg leader). 
e. If the taxpayer were assumed to be a leader and the government a 
follower, the payoffs for the latter would be larger than in a Nash 
1Also players are considered to be risk-neutral. However it can be shown that most of our 
conclusions do not depend on this. See Corchón (1984). 
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equilibrium and, given result (b) aboye, than in a Stackelberg equilibrium 
with the government as a leader. 
f. Maximin strategies call for honest behavior on the taxpayers' part and the 
same probability of monitoring as in a Nash equilibrium. 
g. If the penalty for evasion is sufficientIy high, the Nash equilibrium is 
arbitrarily elose to the core of the game. 
h. Bayesian equilibrium yields identical qualitative conelusions to those of 
Nash equilibrium. 
Needless to say, aH these conelusions must be tested in more general 
models befo re any definite conelusion is drawn. In any case, our approach 
underlines the importance of mixed strategies. They are a natural device in 
our framework, since the elassical argument in favor of them, namely that 
they defend players against the opponent's exploitation of the knowledge of 
her actions, seems perfectIy applicable in our case. Moreover a mixed 
strategy equilibrium can be seen as the limit of Bayesian equilibria [Harsanyi 
(1973)]. 
FinaHy, section 3 gathers together our main conelusions. 
2. The model and the main results 
Consider a game with two players (2/', the taxpayer, and ~, the govern-
ment), and two strategies for each of them (Al' A2 and Bl, B2 respectively). 
We identify Al with evasion (A 2 no evasion) and Bl with monitoring (B2 no 
monitoring). We assume that utility is money, i.e. both players are risk-
neutral. Let Y be the income of 2/'. The value of the tax due will be denoted 
by T. The fine will be proportional to the evaded tax. So if 2/' cheats and is 
caught she gets a fine of dT. We will take d and T as exogenously given. Let 
c be the cost of monitoring and conviction. We assume that c<dT (this may 
be interpreted as saying that the penalty for evasion ineludes the cost of 
monitoring). In order to make the problem interesting we will as sume that 
T> c (i.e. the tax due is greater than the cost of monitoring) and y> T. Table 
1 summarizes our information about the game. 
It follows from our assumptions that 
y> y - T> Y - T( 1 + d ), 
T( 1 + d ) - e > T> T - e > O. 
Hence no dominant strategy exists. 
2.1. Nash equilibrium 
We first as sume that both players have to move simultaneously and that 
information is complete. Both assumptions will be relaxed later on. Let us 
first look for a Nash equilibrium. It is easy to check that there is no Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies. Therefore we introduce mixed strategies. Let p 
be the probability of f!J> taking Al (i.e. she evades), and q the probability of f§ 
taking Bl (i.e. monitoring). Then payoffs for f!J> and f§ (denoted by Mp and 
Mg respectively) are 
Mp=p(q(Y - T(1 +d)) +(1-q)Y) +(1- p)(q(Y - T) +(1-q)(Y - T)), 
Mg=q(p(T -e+dT) +(1- p)(T -e)) +(1-q)(1- p)T, 
Mp=p(T-qT(1 +d))+ Y - T, 
Mg=q(pT(1 +d)-e)+(1- p)T. 
Then, the probabilities associated with a Nash equilibrium are 
* e 
p T(1 +d)' 
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The strategic aspects of the game are present in the values of p* and q*. 
For instance the probability of evading depends directly on e (the more 
costly it is to monitor, the more likely the evasion) and inversely on the 
penalty d. AIso, the probability of monitoring depends inversely on the 
penalty, since a high penalty will discourage evasion, making monitoring 
useless [see Graetz et al. (1986) for similar conclusions]. Equilibrium payoffs 
are 
M~=Y-T, 
M*=T __ e_. 
g 1+d 
Notice that: 
1. An increase in the penalty rate d does not affect M;, but it does affect 
(positively) M!. Hence an increase of d implies a Pareto improvement. 
This result has been obtained (among others) by Graetz et al. (1986). 
2. The expected utility of f!IJ equals truthful payment of due taxes. 
3. Taxation is not bounded by evasion (since oMJoT = 1), contradicting 
Edgeworth (1925) ('In fine the increase of taxation is limited by evasion'). 
4. An increase in T causes a fall in p, i.e. more taxes calls for more honest 
behavior. The reason for this is that if p* > c/T( 1 + d), '§ will always 
investiga te. Therefore f!IJ should decrease p in order to preserve the benefits 
of random evasion. 
5. It is easily seen that p*<q*, and l-q*>p*. Therefore p*<1/2. 
2.2. The Stacke/berg so/ution 
Sorne times it is argued that 'the government, via its agent the tax 
authority, acts as a 'leader', and that taxpayers act as recalcitrant followers' 
[Cowell (1990, p. 123)]. This corresponds to a situation in which '§ moves 
first announcing (and being committed to) sorne strategy, and f!IJ reacts in a 
rational way. This equilibrium is called a 'perfect Nash equilibrium' in 
modern jargon. Here we will show that the Nash equilibrium considered in 
the previous paragraph is also a Stackelberg equilibrium with '§ as leader 
and f!IJ as a follower. 
For the time being assume that no mixed strategy is possible. Hence '§ will 
maximize over the reaction function of f!IJ. A quick inspection of table 1 
shows that (B¡, Al) and (B l , Al) are the possible outcomes. Hence '§ will 
select Bl and the associated payoffs will be (Y - T, T -c). Notice that the 
equilibrium payoff of '§ is in this case T - c < Nash payoff. Now, let us 
introduce mixed strategies. If '§ sets q> 1/(1 + d) from (1) it follows that 
p=O. Them M g =T-cq<T-c/(l+d)=Nash payoff. If '§ sets q<1/(1+d) 
by identical reasoning to before, the optimal reply of f!IJ is p = 1. Then, 
Mg=q(T-c+Td)<T-c/(1+d)=Nash payoff, so q=1/(1+d) is the opti-
mal choice. 
Easy calculations show that in this case M g = T - c/( 1 + d), i.e. it do es not 
pay for '§ to be a Stackelberg leader. This is pretty surprising at first glance, 
since it implies that there is no incentive for '§ to commit himself. However a 
little reflexion on the structure of the game will convince the reader that this 
ís indeed the case. If for instance '§ announces Bl , f!IJ will pay T. However '§ 
can expect this to happen if an adequate randomized (and hence cheaper) 
monitoring is made. If '§ announces Bl , f!IJ will not pay anything. If '§ 
announces a randomized strategy which is not a Nash equilibrium for him, 
eqs. (1) and (2) show that f!IJ will evade or will pay completely. The first case 
is certainly not intended by '§, and the latter can be achieved with a lower q, 
and hence with a lower expected cost. In other words, given the discontinuity 
in pjJ's behavior, the expected return of tax evasion should be zero, just like 
in the Nash equilibrium. This contrasts with Graetz et al. (1986) where ~'s 
lack of commitment causes a loss in revenue. This contrast is explained by 
the fact that it is essential for their model that a fraction of taxpayers are 
'pathologically honest' [see Mookherjee (1989, p. 22)]. 
Finally, let us assume that pjJ is a leader and ~ is a follower. This 
corresponds to a situation in which pjJ has to send her report befo re ~ can 
take any action. Since T( 1 + d) > c the taxpayer will pay his entire taxes. 
Thus, equilibrium gives more utility to ~ than any other non cooperative 
solution. This is due to the fact that under complete information ~ can catch 
any evader with probability one, i.e. if information is also perfect the 
opportunities for tax evasion vanish. Notice that in this case mixed strategies 
do not make any sense. 
2.3. Maximin behavior 
In our case, Nash equilibrium can be objected to on grounds of being 
unprofitable [see Harsanyi (1966)], Le. Nash equilibrium payoffs are equal to 
maximin payoffs but Nash strategies are different from maximin strategies. In 
this case, it can be argued that maximin behavior is more plausible [see 
Holler (1990, p. 322 and the references therein)]. Thus it seems sensible to 
analyze the consequences of assuming maximin behavior. From eqs. (1) and 
(2) it follows that maximin strategies are p + = ° and q + = 1/( 1 + d), i.e., pjJ is 
honest and ~ monitors with the same probability as in a Nash equilibrium. 
2.4. The cooperative approach 
In our framework, it is easy to see that any non-cooperative equilibrium 
yields inefficient outcomes. We now consider cooperative solution concepts 
and relate the outcomes obtained by cooperation with those obtained under 
no cooperation. 
Let us take the core as the solution concept. From section 2.3 aboye, it 
follows that ~ can guarantee himself T - c/( 1 + d) and pjJ, Y-T. Hence 
(A2 , B2 ) is in the core of this game, as well the line (A, (A2 , B2» in fig. 1. 
Notice that the core in pure strategies coincides with the Stackelberg 
equilibrium with pjJ as leader. Also when c/( 1 + d) ~O, (i.e. either the 
monitoring cost tends to zero or the penalty becomes very high) we have 
that: 
a. The Nash equilibrium tends to the core; hence a high penalty will 
implement a core outcome through a Nash equilibrium, approximately, 
and 
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b. the core shrinks towards (T, y - T). 
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The previous analysis can be criticized since under complete information it 
is not at all clear which kind of tax evasion is captured by the model. There 
are two possible answers to this question. On the one hand, mixed strategies 
can be understood as the limit of Bayesian equilibrium, when uncertainty 
over types becomes negligible [see Harsanyi (1973)]. On the other hand, 
under simultaneous moves, those taxpayers who evade can get away with it 
in absence of monitoring. The same happens if '§ moves tirst. So in these 
models tax evasion arises from wrong monitoring and not from incomplete 
information. This is also seen by noting that evasion is impossible if f!jJ plays 
tirst. Here we will consider explicitIy a game with incomplete information in 
order to see what difference it makes. It will be shown that conclusions 
obtained under complete information are carried out with straightforward 
modifications. This reinforces our idea that tax evasion is due to imperfect, 
rather than, incomplete information. 
For the sake of simplicity suppose that '§ is uncertain about the true value 
of the tax due, but f!J' is not, i.e. we assume one-sided uncertainty. This can 
be formalized by saying that f!J' can be of types 1, ... , n with taxes due 
t¡, ... , t n and that f!J' knows her true type but '§ does not. Let us assume that 
the probability of f!J' being of type i = 1, ... ,n - denoted by 1t¡ - is common 
knowledge. Let t = Il= 1 1t¡t¡ be the expected value of taxes due. 
We first notice that the optimal strategy set by f!J' is independent of her 
type and identical to the Nash equilibrium case. This follows from the fact 
that fines are proportional to taxes due and therefore the utility function of 
f!J' if she where of type i is t¡p( 1-q( 1 + d)) + Yi - t¡ where Yi is her income. 
Thus if 1 > (resp. <)q(l+d) the optimal p is 1 (resp. O). If l=q(l+d) any p 
maximizes the aboye expression. Since the optimal probability is independent 
of the type, we will denote it by p as before. 
When playing against type i '§ can expect a payofT of q(pt¡(l+d)-c)+ 
(1- p)t¡. Therefore expected payofTs for '§ are 
n 
M g = I 1t¡(q(pt¡(l+d)-c)+(l-p)t¡). 
¡= 1 
And from this equation we obtain the result that if t( 1 + d) > e, In any 
Bayesian equilibrium with simultaneous reports and monitors 
, e 
p = t(l +d)' 
, 1 
q = 1 +d' 
Then it is easy to show that all the conclusions obtained in sections 
2.1-2.4 carry on under incomplete information. However - in contrast to aH 
our previous results - the extension to non-risk-neutral agents is not 
straightforward. See Sanchez (1987) and Scotchmer (1987) for additional 
results with risk-neutral taxpayers. FinaHy if t(l + d) < e, i.e. if expected profit 
from a monitoring is negative, equilibrium entails p = 1 and q = O. 
3. Conclusions 
In this paper we have considered a simple model of strategic interaction 
between taxpayers and the government focusing our attention on the case in 
which taxpayers' decision is dichotomous (to be inside or outside the black 
economy) in a static framework. Moreover, we did not study how taxes are 
set, i.e. in terminology of Cowell (1990, p. 131) we focus on pure enforcement. 
However sorne conclusions appear to be robust enough to be worth 
mentioning. 
First, the probability of monitoring is the same in Nash, Stackelberg (with 
~ as a leader), maximin and Bayesian equilibria. 
Second, the probability of evading is the same (and positive) in Nash, 
Stackelberg (with ~ as a leader), and Bayesian equilibria. However in both 
maximin and Stackelberg (with f!jJ as a leader) the taxpayer is honest. This 
probability can be interpreted under sorne circumstances as the equilibrium 
relative size of the underground economy. 
Third, the payoff of f!jJ in every non-cooperative equilibrium is the same as 
if she where honest. 
Fourth, a high penalty for evaders is (as in many models of tax evasion) 
socially desirable. Of course introducing a probability of error in convictions 
[see Bolton (1986)] may yield an appropriate upper bound to penalties [see 
Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1987) for cases in which this is not the case and an 
infinite penalty is socially desirable]. 
Fifth, tax evasion is due to imperfect, rather than incomplete, information. 
Sixth, revenues from taxes are maximized when ~ is a follower and f!jJ is a 
Stackelberg leader. 
How should the last result be interpreted? Since present-day governments 
can scarcely be considered as maximizing agents, the emphasis must be on 
the normative side. In this sen se, our analysis recommends ~ to behave as a 
follower (it must be remarked that there is nothing surprising in the fact that 
payoffs for the government are higher for a follower than for a leader: The 
same happens in models of price-making firms in the literature on industrial 
organization). However, this kind of solution makes sense if the decision of 
being a member of the black economy is taken before ~ takes any action. 
This implies a delay which may be unacceptable beca use of legal constraints 
or because of high interest andjor inflation rates. Notice that an important 
consequence of all this is that when modeling tax evasion 'a la principal-
agent' (in which ~ acts as a leader) we are not exploring the best alternative 
from ~'s point of view. In other words, in general models we may regard 
evasion as arising from both incomplete and imperfect information. If ~ acts 
as a follower, the opportunities for evasion arising from the latter disappear. 
Finally we mention two possible extensions of our work: First, to model 
explicitly the interests of monitors [see Laffont and Tirole (1988)], and 
second to consider evasion and consumption in a unified framework (see 
Andersen (1977); Sandmo (1981) and Cowell (1981)]. 
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